SPECIAL REPORT:A Turkey's Power Struggle |
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January 26, 2019
Email-ID 190355 Two general comments A 1)A A A Be very careful with language a** the turks are touchy about a great many things, and nothing more so than themselves a** there are many places within where you could goad them to anger for word choice (as opposed to content) and def stay scrupulously away from anything that hints of support of one side or another 2)A A A This needs some sort of geographic grounder in here and I think the best way to do that is to near the front discuss the Istanbul/Anatolian split and how it has reshaped the country over the decades a** that is a natural outgrowth of the monograph, and I think its worth doing this in parallel with a monograph (leta**s talk about the Istanbul/Anatolian split regardless) A A Graphics: Turkey and its neighborhood map Political gradient for Turkish media Text chart of Turkish banks Text chart of business conglomerates Turkish embassy map A Display themes: Military v. civilian government (pic of army chief Basburg and PM Erdogan) Headscarves and universities Gulenist schools Turkish newspapers a** Zaman v. Hurriyet Court battles ** Emre may be able to provide some photographs for use in this piece A A A SPECIAL REPORT:A Turkeya**s Power Struggle A A A deep power struggle is gripping the Republic of Turkey. Most people
watching Turkey from the outside see this as the latest phase of
Turkeya**s decades-long battle between Islamism and Kemalist secularism.
Others paint it as a battle between the forces of pan-Turkism and Turkish
nationalism, traditional Anatolia against modern Istanbul, egalitarianism A In the following special report, STRATFOR will tell the story of an
Islamist-oriented Anatolia rapidly rising to challenge the Kemalist
foundation of the Turkish state. While those looking at Turkey from the
outside are often ignorant of the internal tumult brewing in the state,
this is a labyrinthine power struggle that influences virtually every move
Turkey makes, whether in parliament, schools, courts, newspapers,
ministries, military bases, embassies or business meetings. Turkeya**s A A Power Struggle Rooted in Geopolitics A The Republic of Turkey occupies a highly geostrategic position in the
world. The country sits at the crossroads of Asia and Europe and forms a
bridge between the Black and Mediterranean Seas. When Turkey is powerful,
the country follows a pan-Islamic model more multi-confessional than
panislamic and can extend itself far and wide, from balancing the Arabs A This was the feeling in Turkey, then the multiethnic Ottoman Empire, at
the end of World War I. With the aid of the victorious European powers,
currents of ethnic nationalism surged through the empire and dissolved the
bonds of Ottoman control. The real blow to the Ottoman core came in the
form of the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which dismembered the Empire by ceding A Times of crisis call for great leaders. This piece is pretty flowery to
this point a** need to cut most of that That leader for Turkey was Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk, a man who earned the name a**Father of the Turksa** and
whose face is enshrined in statues, currency, paintings and emblems in
every corner of the country.A Ataturka**s mission was to save the Turkish A To preserve his vision of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk bolstered a secular elite that would dominate the banks and industry of Istanbul and keep a firm grip over the countrya**s armed forces. Ataturk regarded the Turkish military as the guardian of the Kemalist state, a responsibility that Turkish generals have frequently exploited to mount coups against the civilian political authority. For decades, this secularist-Kemalist model prevailed in Turkey while a more traditional, Islamist-minded Anatolian class watched in frustration as they were sidelined from the corridors of power. A As the 20th century started to close in, however, a tremor began spreading
through Turkeya**s political landscape. Turkey by then had gone through
its fair share of political tumult, but with time, had built up enough
internal consolidation to start looking abroad again through a pan-Islamic
lens. The election of the Islamist-rooted Welfare Party (RP) in 1996,
which later evolved into the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in
2002 under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was
largely considered an affront to everything the Kemalists held dear.
A The Battle Lines A The AK Party is by no means alone in implementing its vision. There is a
powerful force in the shadows that over the course of four decades has
quietly and effectively penetrated the armor of the Kemalist state. That
force is known as the Gulen movement, a transnational organization led by
a highly respected and charismatic imam, Fethullah Gulen. A The Kemalists have long viewed the Gulen movement as a critical threat to the Turkish republic. When Gulen was expelled from the country in 1997, the court documents against him included sermons in which he called on his followers to "move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers.a** He also said that a**the time is not yet right. You must wait for the time when you are complete and conditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it.a** A More than a decade later, the Gulen movement's presence is seen in
virtually all power centers of Turkey. In its earlier years, the movement
moved much more discreetly and acted more as a secret society as it
focused on weaving through the arteries of the system without drawing
attention to itself. Since 2007, however, it appears that the conditions A The AK Party, meanwhile, is not in lockstep with the Gulen movement. The party does not see eye to eye with the Gulenists on a number of issues and consciously attempts to keeps its distance from the group for fear of reinforcing allegations by the secularists that the AKP is pursuing a purely Islamist agenda. But the two sides also need each other and have a mutual desire to replace the traditional secular elite, an objective which forms the basis of their symbiotic relationship: The Gulen movement provides the AK Party with a social base to hold power, while the AK party provides the Gulen with a political platform to push its agenda. A Turkeya**s wrenching search for national identity spans every corner of
society. In the education realm, the Gulen movement is a preponderant
force, creating schools across the globe A can you narrow that down
somewhat? to extend Turkish influence and intelligence capabilities. The
battle is fiercest in the security arena, where generals are now being
thrown in jail over murky coup allegations on a regular basis. In Turkish
embassies around the world, the number of diplomats educated in Gulenist
schools is steadily rising. A A EDUCATION: Sowing Seeds in Schools A Turkeya**s power struggle begins in the classroom. The Gulen movement has spent the past three decades working aggressively in the education sector to mold young minds in Turkish schools both at home and abroad. The goal is to create a well-educated generation of Turks who ascribe to the Gulen tradition and have the technical skills (and under the AKP, the political connections) to assume high positions in strategic sectors of the economy, government and armed forces. A The AKP-run government distributes for free textbooks published by the
Gulen movement in primary schools, which are increasing in number along
with thousands of Imam-Hatip schools and state-run Quran schools. The
Imam-Hatip schools while religious, have over the years evolved into
technical high schools for blue collar laborers, many of whom come from A The most intense period of indoctrination for many Turks takes place between grades eight through the twelve, when the adolescent mind is at its most raw and malleable stage. According to a Middle East Quarterly interview with Gulena**s deputy, Nurettin Veren, the Gulen movement claims to have 75 percent of Turkeya**s two million high school students enrolled in the movementa**s private high schools. The schools are not madrassas. In fact, they focus heavily on the sciences and math. That said, religious classes and customs do make their way into the curriculum and daily activities. A The Gulenist educational institutions are the easiest to spot because they
typically have the newest facilities, best equipment and offer the most
intensive preparation courses for university entrance exams. Which raises
a question a** wherea**s the funding come from? These exams will make or
break a Turkish studenta**s career and are remembered by most Turkish A Students who have attended these schools describe how the a**brothersa**
that run these Light Houses have their students follow an intense
curriculum that keeps the students at the schools late at night and
studying on the weekends instead of out socializing and engaging in
behavior that might be looked down upon by the religious conservatives. A The next step is the university. The pivot of the university battle is an
institution called the Higher Education Council (YOK). YOK was created by
the 1982 Constitution to keep a lid on political dissent in the
universities since prior to the 1980 military coup, universities were the
driving forces behind the political violence between right and left-wing
activists that marred the 1970s in Turkey. Up until 2007, YOK was a
bastion for hardcore secularists in Turkey to ensure their dominance over A When the last secular president of YOK retired in 2007, the AKP had its
chance to appoint one of its own, professor Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, an AKP
loyalist and sympathizer of the Gulen movement. YOK has been at the
forefront of the highly polarizing headscarf issue in Turkey and has used
its powers to appoint religious conservatives to university presidencies. A Strategic Placement A But the Gulen movement and AKP do not only want loyal students to attend
Gulen schools. Indeed, a core part of their strategy is to ensure the
placement of their students in the secular universities where they can
gradually grow in number and position themselves to influence strategic
institutions. For example, the university results of a Gulenist student
may qualify him to attend the most elite Istanbul university, but the
movement will arrange for the student to attend a military academy A Studying Abroad with Gulen A Over the course of the past couple decades, the Gulen movement has spread
itself to virtually every corner of the globe through its pervasive
education network.A The Gulenist international footprint is made up of
500 private schools, which span 115 countries, 35 of which are in Africa.
These Gulenist schools can be found in small towns in Ethiopia, Bosnia, A Again, the facilities and quality of instruction at these schools are
top-notch, which make them attractive places for elite families to send
their children for their education. The primary funding for these schools
comes from Gulenist businessmen, who donate a portion of their revenues
toward schools in an assigned region in return for the help that they
receive from the movement in finding business deals. The curriculum at
these schools covers math, sciences, as well as Turkish and English A The Gulenists have made a conscious attempt to avoid the perception that they are proselytizing students through these schools. Lessons in Islam tend to be more prevalent in Gulenist schools where the religion already has a base. For example, Islam has a deep history in the Caucasus and Central Asia, but the religion has also been severely undermined by decades of communist rule. Many Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and other descendants of the Soviet Union simply have trouble identifying with Islam as their religion, much less a way of life. The Gulenist schools in these regions have an agenda to revive moderate Islam in the former Soviet space. This is not to say that the Gulenists are radicalizing these countries. In fact, the Gulenists emphasize that the Turkish version of Islam that they teach is moderate in its approach and distinct from the strict Islamic practices of Saudi Arabia and Iran. A But the Gulenists are not welcome in every country in which they attempt
to set up shop. Iran and Saudi Arabia have no interest in having their
population come under the influence of a foreign strand of Islam, and have
both kept the door firmly shut to Gulenist schools. In the Netherlands,
where Islamophobia runs particularly high in Western Europe, the
government has cut funding to Gulenist institutions theya**ve been able to
get state funding in places?. Russia, a natural competitor to Turkey, is
extremely wary of this Gulenist channel of influence and has reportedly
shut down at least 16 schools so far. A The Gulenist educational crusade has met its fair share of resistance, and
this resistance is only likely to increase as the movementa**s profile
rises and as countries grow nervous over Turkeya**s expanding influence.
Regions like Africa, however, where countries are already desperate for
development, Muslims are in abundance, chaotic conditions prevail and A SECURITY: Taking on the Military A As the father of the modern Turkish republic, Ataturk wanted to ensure his work and vision for Turkey would remain intact long after his death.A That job was left primarily to the military. A Article 148 of the Military Penal Code proclaims the military to act as the a**vanguard of the revolutiona** with the right to a**intervene in the political sphere if the survival of the state would otherwise be left in grave jeopardy.a** Article 34 of the Army Internal Service Law of 1935 also gives the military the constitutional right to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the republic. The republic, according to the majority of the armed forces and the Kemalist camp, is the liberal and secular republic founded by Ataturk, not the religiously conservative republic growing under the rule of the Islamist-oriented AKP. A Worth mentioning the party that is the heir to his legacy here A Regardless of Ataturka**s intent to keep the military out of politics,
Turkish generals throughout much of Turkeya**s history interpreted these
constitutional rights to intervene in the civilian affairs of the state
whenever stability was threatened or the secular fabric of the country
showed signs of unraveling. Consequently, Turkey has experienced three
military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and one a**soft coupa** in 1997,
when the military worked through the courts to bring down the government A Turkeya**s Islamists knew that if they had any chance of overturning the power balance of the state, they would have to take on the armed forces. The process would be slow, quiet and deliberate, but would ultimately strip the military of its long-held untouchable status. A From Deep State to Ergenekon A The Gulen movement strategically began with the police intelligence
services.A The Turkish police force had long been the weakest institution
within the security apparatus. This was largely a reflection of the
countrya**s rural-urban divide through much of the 20th Century. In the
early part of the century, the rural population comprised two-thirds of
the country, giving the gendarmerie, the branch of the armed services that
controls the countryside, far more influence than the police, who
patrolled the urban areas. A The Islamists now had a powerful tool to undercut their secularist rivals.
Not only did they have the pervasiveness of a security network that
patrols the vast majority of Turkeya**s population, but they also
possessed the same wiretapping capabilities as the MIT ??? to uproot the
deep state and neutralize the militarya**s grip over the government. Need
to flat out state what you mean here, which I think is that therea**s been
a clandestine investigative/civil war going on in turkeya**s bowels for a A Though there is little doubt that there were elements of the Deep State who were legitimately rolled up in this Ergenekon probe, there is also reason to believe that this probe took on a life of its own and was increasingly used by the state as a tool to quash political dissent. The AKP defended the probe to the outside world as a sign of Turkeya**s democratization, arguing that Turkey was finally evolving to a point where the military could be brought under civilian control. But as the Ergenekon probe continued to grow, the legitimacy of the indictments began to be questioned with greater frequency. By late 2009, the investigations began to slow down. Then, in Jan. 2010, the other shoe dropped. A Breaking Precedent With Jailed Generals A A new and even more politically explosive coup plot was revealed by Taraf
newspaper, a Gulenist media outlet. The plot, called Balyoz, or
Sledgehammer, allegedly involved 162 members of the armed forces,
including 29 generals, who composed a 5,000 page document in 2003, shortly
after the AKP came to power, that detailed plans to sow violence in the
country and create the conditions for a military takeover in order to
a**get rid of every single threat to the secular order of the state.a**
A The military was backed against a wall. Though it still had enough influence over the courts to fight the arrests, there was no question that it was locked into an uphill battle against the Islamist forces. The Ergenekon probes that began in 2007 went after retired soldiers, but the arrests of active-duty generals in Sledgehammer completely broke with precedent. What was once considered unthinkable for Turks across the country was now becoming a reality: the military, the self-proclaimed vanguard of the secular state, was turning impotent. Rephrase a** it implies that they cana**t function as a military, and I think you simply mean they were weakening as a political force A While the AKP and Gulen movement already have de-facto ownership of the
countrya**s police intelligence, they are also making significant inroads
into MIT, the national intelligence service that has long been dominated
by the secularist establishment and has historically spent a good portion
of its time keeping tabs on domestic political opponents, like the AKP.
The Turkish National Security Council in late April appointed 42-year-old
bureaucrat Hakan Fidan, as the new MIT chief. A It has now become all the more imperative for the military to hold onto
the security issues that still give the armed forces some leverage against
the AKP. The so-called Kurdish problem oh def phrase that differently and
the Cyprus dispute with Greece top this list, but even in these arenas the
AKP is working aggressively to take ownership of these issues by recasting
them to the public as inherently political problems that can be resolved
through economic development and diplomacy, as opposed to military might. A MEDIA AND BUSINESS:A Anatolian Tigers Challenge the Istanbul Elite A Turkeya**s media sits at the center of the countrya**s power struggle: A The media is an especially potent tool in the Gulenist and AKP fight
against the armed forces. The vast majority of leaks in the Ergenekon and
Sledgehammer probes have mysteriously emanated from a single newspaper: A Most of Turkeya**s predominantly secularist media, including Hurriyet,
Milliyet and Cumhurriyet, have been around as long as the republic itself,
and have consequently dominated the mediaa**s point of view for most of
Turkeya**s history. Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, the Islamist
forces began making their appearance in the media world through newspapers
like Zaman, Sabah and Star. Today, these newspapers are dominating the
Turkish media scene with pro-AKP coverage. A INSERT POLITICAL GRADIENT GRAPHIC FOR TURKISH MEDIA (Includes most prominent media outlets, ownership, political orientation and circulation) A The most prominent media war in this power struggle is being played out between Dogan media group, owned by one of Turkeya**s leading business conglomerates, and Feza Yayincilik media group, with Dogana**s Hurriyet and Fezaa**s Zaman newspapers at the epicenter of the battle. Dogan Media claims it is anti-one party government, and has publicly proclaimed the need to balance against the rapid growth of pro-AKP/Gulenist news. However, after the Dogan group spent considerable news coverage on a corruption scandal involving money laundering through Islamist charities by senior members of the Erdogan government in 2008, the media group soon found itself slapped with a $2.5 billion fine (check) for alleged unpaid back taxes. A While tax fraud is relatively common practice in Turkeya**s media sector across the political spectrum, there is deep suspicion that Dogan in many ways was singled to serve as an example to other media of what can happen to a powerful business tycoon that refuses to toe the AKP line. Members with the pro-AKP/Gulenist media camp meanwhile charge that Dogan got what it deserved and cite the fining of the group as an example of a more democratic society that no longer shies away from punishing powerful offenders. This is where Turkeya**s media battles enter the corporate arena, where a quiet and brooding competition is being played out between the old Istanbul elite and the rising Anatolian tigers. A The Corporate Struggle A Turkeya**s business sector is dominated by a handful of secular family conglomerates based in Istanbul who for decades have served as Turkeya**s business outlet to the rest of the world. On the other side of the struggle are the millions of small and medium businesses who have their roots in more socially/religiously conservative Anatolia. While the secular-nationalists still have the upper hand in the business world, the Anatolian tigers WC are slowly but surely finding WC their strength in numbers. A The following names dominate the Turkish economy: Sabanci, Koc, Dogan,
Dogus, Zorlu and Calik. Dogan Group occupies the staunchly secular niche
of the business sector that sits at odds with the AKPa**s Islamist-rooted
vision, and has taken a public stand against the ruling party. Sabanci and
Dogus also belong in the staunchly secular group, but tend to exhibit a
more neutral stance in public toward the AKP in the interest of
maintaining business and avoiding the kinds of legal battles that Dogan
has faced. A INCLUDE TEXT CHART OF BUSINESS CONGLOMERATES AND NET WORTH OF EACH A The lines dividing Turkeya**s business, media and politics are blurry in
Turkey. Several of Turkeya**s prominent business conglomerates contain
media outlets, and the AKP has worked to ensure those media outlets remain
friendly - or at least neutral - to the party. Those that oblige are often
awarded business contracts by the state, while those that resist, such as A This intersection between politics and business can also be seen in the
energy sector. The AKP has a strategy to boost four energy firms in the
country who have politically aligned themselves with the ruling party. The
firms are divided among Turkeya**s four main energy areas of interest:
Calika**s Park Teknic in Russia, SOM in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, Inci A The AKP and Gulen movement lack the leverage that the
secularist-nationalists hold in the banking sector, but that hasna**t A INCLUDE TEXT CHART OF TURKISH BANKS A The Gulenist Business Cycle A The AKP and Gulen movement understand well that there isna**t much space
for them to compete in the Western-oriented trade markets ruled by Koc,
Sabanci and the other secularist business elites. Instead, the Islamist
forces have created their own business model, one that speaks for Anatolia
and focuses on accessing markets in places like the Middle East, Africa, A As opposed to the Istanbul-entrenched secularist corporations, most businessmen who belong to TUSKON hail from small, generally poorer and religiously conservative towns and cities across Anatolia. TUSKON is tightly linked into the Gulen movement and forms an integral part of the Gulenist business, education, political and even foreign intelligence agenda. The business association organizes massive business conferences in various parts of the globe that are attended by high-level AKP officials and aim to bring into contact hundreds of Turkish businessmen with their foreign counterparts. While there are variations to how the Gulenist business cycle works, the following is a basic example: A A small Turkish businessman from the eastern Anatolian city of Gaziantep
makes a living manufacturing and selling shirt buttons. A Gulenist will
invite the button-maker to a TUSKON business conference in Africa, where
he will be put into contact with a shirt-maker from Tanzania who will buy
his buttons. The Turkish button-maker and the Tanzanian shirt-maker are A The Foreign Policy Enabler A The Gulenist transnational network is a natural complement to the AKPa**s
foreign policy agenda. While many within the secularist and nationalist
camp are highly uncomfortable with the notion of pan-Islamism and
pan-Turkism a** strategies that, in their eyes, brought about the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire a** AKP followers embrace their Ottoman past and A Turkeya**s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has historically been dominated by
members of the secularist camp. They continue to maintain a strong
presence in Turkish embassies since Turkish diplomats generally have to be
in the business for an average of 20 years before they reach a position of
influence. But this too is a reality that is also gradually shifting under INCLUDE TURKISH EMBASSY MAP A The Turkish Cooperation Development Agency (TIKA) is also key to these
foreign policy efforts. TIKA was created by the Turkish government in the
early 1990s to forge ties with former Soviet Union countries with Turkic
links, but did not make much headway at the time. The AKP, however,
reinvigorated the TIKA in recent years for use as a public diplomacy tool, A Gulenists privately boast that their institutions abroad, whether schools, hospitals or other types of developmental agencies, serve as useful intelligence satellites for the foreign ministry. If a problem erupts in a country in Central Asia, for example, where press freedoms are nonexistent and information is extremely difficult to come by, the foreign ministry can call on their local Gulenist contacts to provide information and help facilitate government contacts. The Gulenists who are living abroad, after all, often learn the local languages of these countries and can translate to and from Turkish and the local language. They have also developed close relationships with the local government through their work as well as their students, who are often sons and daughters of the political elite in the countries in which they are operating. Correct me if Ia**m wrong, but this entire network has been set up completely separate from the state, right? If so pls make that bluntly clear earlier in the piece where you first introduce the network A Image Control A AKP officials, often deny in private these Gulenist claims of intelligence
satellites, not wanting to be viewed as too tightly linked to the Gulen
abroad for fear that they might be viewed as pursuing a subversive
Islamist agenda. Indeed some within the extreme left in Turkey have gone
so far as to cast the Gulen movement as a group of violent Islamist
extremists with an ultimate aim to impose Shariah law in Turkey. This
characterization is grossly inaccurate, and belongs to a fringe group A This is why the AKP has spent a considerable amount of effort in pursuing
negotiations with the European Union for full-fledged membership, in spite
of the extremely low likelihood that these talks will actually go
anywhere. Poll numbers reveal how Turks across the country are
increasingly coming to the realization that EU membership remains WC a**
has dwindled to a very distant possibility. Yet the AKP cannot afford to
allow that disillusionment translate into its foreign policy because..... A This notion of image control becomes especially important in Turkeya**s
relationship with the United States. Turkey lives in a whirlwind of
conspiracies, and both sides of the power struggle will make the argument
that the United States is backing one faction against the other. For
example, the secularists point to the fact that Fethullah Gulen lives in
Pennsylvania and was granted political asylum in the United States as
a**evidencea** that the US government is supporting the AKPa**s rise. At A By keeping the EU bid alive, relations with Washington under control not
clear how they are doing that and one foot firmly planted in the West, the
Islamists can better undermine secularist efforts to defame the AKPa**s
international image. The AKP will continue to keep a fair bit of distance
from the Gulen in its dealings abroad to protect this image, but the A JUDICIARY: Neutralizing the High Courts A Whether the issue is headscarves worn in universities, media firms charged with tax evasion or soldiers charged with coup-plotting, virtually every strand of Turkeya**s power struggle finds itself in the courts. A The dividing political line in the judiciary is between the secularist-dominated high courts and the AKP-influenced low courts. This division results in a dizzying judicial system in which court rulings are often mired in political mayhem and are consequently tossed back and forth between the feuding factions. A The headscarf controversy is perhaps the best illustration of the struggle
between religious and secularist forces in the judiciary. To make a long
story short, heh a** way too late for that Turkeya**s secularist-dominated
State Council has long barred Turkish women from wearing the headscarf in
the public sector, making it difficult for religious females WC! in Turkey A This is a battle arena in which the secularists continue to hold the upper
hand against the Islamists. Through their dominance of the high courts,
the secularists hold the single most potent weapon in this struggle: the
ability to ban political parties for violating the secular tradition of
the state. The AKP is all too familiar with this threat. The
Constitutional Court has banned three AKP predecessors a** Milli Selamet
Partisi (in 1980), Refah Partisi (in 1998) and Fazilet Partisi (in 2001) A The higher judiciary in Turkey is made up of the Constitutional Court ("Anayasa Mahkemesi" in Turkish), the High Court of Appeals ("YargA:+-tay"), the State Council ("Danistay"), and the High Panel of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). The seven-member HSYK plays an instrumental role in the appointments of judges and prosecutors across the country. In the current system, the HSYK is made up of the Justice Minister, his undersecretary, three members appointed by Yargitay and two appointed by Danistay. Within this coterie of judicial elite, the secularists have long held their grip on the most powerful judicial institutions in the country. Seems this belongs earlier in this section A The AKPa**s package of constitutional amendments calls for several
critical changes. One is the restructuring of the Constitutional Court and
HSYK that would end the secularist monopoly and give the lower judiciary
more clout. For example, the HYSK reforms call for increasing the number
of members from seven to 21. Out of this group, 10 would be elected by A As expected, the secularists in the high courts and parliament, backed by
the military behind the scenes, are hotly opposed to these changes, and
charge that these reforms will eliminate the checks and balances of the
state. They also claim that the reforms are illegal:A clause four of
Turkey's 1982 Constitution, states that amendments to the first three
clauses of the ConstitutionA - clauses which declare Turkey a Turkish
speaking, democratic and secular republic loyal to the nationalism of A The package of constitutional amendments barely made it through the Turkeya**s Grand National Assembly May 7, when 336 deputies gave their vote of approval to the reforms. While this passed the 330 threshold for the government to put the reforms to a public referendum, the parliamentary vote was short of the two-thirds majority needed to formally adopt the amendments. A The battleground is laid, and the struggle will be fierce in the months ahead. AKP and Gulen leaders cannot claim with confidence that the referendum will pass, but they know that the stakes are high:A if the amendments pass, the Islamists will establish the legal foundation to accelerate their political rise. If the referendum collapses, the secularists will retain the most critical weapon in their arsenal to uphold the Kemalist traditions of the republic. A Game, set, match. err A A A A A A A A A A
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